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1  Introduction 
 
Social responsible investment (SRI), defined as the combination of financial performance 
objectives with concerns about social, environmental and ethical issues, is surging and in 
Europe reached EUR 1.033 trillion at the end of December 2005. However a difference 
should be made between broad and core SRI. There are indeed various SRI practices, 
mutually non-exclusive, from negative screenings to so-called "best-in-class" approach: 
negative screenings lead fund managers to exclude from the fund investment universe 
companies involved in "non-ethical" activities (for example, alcohol, weapons, fur trade...) 
whereas the best-in-class approach conducts to consider any economic sector as eligible for 
the investment portfolio and to overweight, within each economic sector considered, 
companies with higher environmental, social or corporate governance standards. As a matter 
of fact, the SRI universe cannot be considered as homogeneous. Yet, academic literature on 
European ethical finance often opposes SRI funds to conventional funds, regardless of the 
specific nature of SRI criteria used by fund managers and traditionally conclude that risk-
adjusted returns of both type of funds are close. By aggregating SRI funds, this methodology 
creates a bias that mitigates the potential impact of negative screening on the size of the 
investment universe and, as a consequence, may mislead on their effective financial 
performance. Barnett and Salomon [2006] and Renneboog et al. [2008a] did consider the 
intensity and the type of screenings used by SRI funds. However, they posited a functional 
relationship between social and financial performance that might correspond to empirical 
evidence but has no proven theoretical foundations and remains controversial. The authors 
did indeed consider that the screening used by SRI funds has curvilinear, no monotonic 
effects and financial performance whereas Renneboog et al. [2008a] implemented a linear 
specification of the link between screening activity and risk-adjusted performance. 
Considering European ethical finance on the contrary to Barnet and Salomon [2006] who 
worked solely on US SRI universe and in order to avoid a too restrictive representation, we 
make no assumption on the functional link between social motivations and financial 
performance. To do so, we constitute SRI funds portfolios with similar negative screening 
strategies and investigate to what extent the investment style of these ethical funds, measured 
in terms of CAPM betas, and their financial performance, measured in terms of Jensen's 
alphas, are affected by the intensity of excluding criteria. We also propose a GARCH 
framework in order to take into account possible ARCH effects in volatility of SRI excess 
returns, which contributes to improve the academic knowledge on ethical finance. It should 
indeed be noted that Barnett and Salomon [2006], and Renneboog et al. [2008a] considered, 
in line with the existing literature on ethical finance, a conventional econometric framework 
based on OLS regressions to estimate the CAPM and four factors models, whereas financial 
series are often characterized by ARCH effects. Mill [2006] did use a GARGH model to 
incorporate timevarying volatility clustering but focused solely on the financial performance 
of a UK Unit trust that adopted SRI principles. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents both the CAPM and the Carhart-Fama-
French model implemented in our analysis; section 3 reports data and results. Finally, section 
4 concludes. 
 
2  Review of literature 
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A growing literature exists on the evaluation of SRI fund financial performances. Most 
articles investigate the traditional wisdom that those types of funds should under-perform 
traditional ones, since extra-financial criteria are taken into account. As the potential 
investment universe is restricted to firms satisfying social responsibility criteria, the mean-
variance optimization is supposed to be altered. However, it appears that there is no particular 
evidence that any such assertion is grounded if risk-adjusted measures of financial 
performance are used. Models implemented in these studies are mainly either based on the 
Fama-French three-factor asset pricing model, allowing for differences in return not only 
between small cap and large cap portfolios but also between high and low book-to-market 
ratios portfolios, or on its extension developed by Carhart [1997] that controls for momentum 
bias. The early studies focused on both the US and UK markets and predominantly showed 
that social and environmental screenings do not affect financial performance, measured in 
terms of alphas (see for example Luther et al. [1992] and Hamilton et al. [1993]). 
Evidence from multi-country analysis leads to the same conclusion regarding conventional 
and ethical fund performances. Focusing on 103 European and US ethical mutual funds for 
the 1990-2001 period, Bauer et al. [2005] have particularly shown that there is no significant 
difference in risk-adjusted returns between conventional and SRI funds, in spite of a higher 
expense ratio for SRI funds. However, the authors have pointed out differences in investment 
styles since ethical funds appeared to be less exposed to market return volatility. The 
existence of a small cap bias has also been highlighted for both UK and German SRI funds. 
Similarly, Renneboog et al. [2008a] have brought to the fore the fact that SRI funds in the 
US, the UK, but also in many European and Asia-Pacific countries under-performed their 
domestic benchmarks. However, their risk-adjusted returns are similar to returns of their 
conventional counterparts. They have also noticed that there is mixed evidence of a "smart 
money" effect for SRI funds. Whereas investors are unable to identify funds that will 
outperform in the future, they may on the contrary have the ability to distinguish those that 
will perform poorly. In an original approach initiated by Bollen [2007], Benson and 
Humphrey [2008] have assessed for the January 1991-September 2005 period the 
determinants of fund flows, defined as the monthly difference between total net assets, for 
both conventional and SRI funds. They have shown that the average total net assets of SRI 
funds are higher than conventional funds and that these funds are less sensitive to changes in 
returns. According to previous literature, the authors have also underlined that SRI funds 
exhibit the same asymmetric relationship between performance and fund flows observed in 
conventional funds. They have finally highlighted that ethical investors are less likely to 
switch funds than conventional investors since they are restricted by the limited number of 
SRI funds available. 
Surprisingly, the fact that non-financial criteria significantly differ from one SRI fund to 
another has not much been taken into account in previous studies. Most studies indeed define 
social responsible investment as the inclusion of ethical criteria regardless of the specific 
nature of ethical screenings (best in class approach vs. exclusion) or their intensity. However, 
Barnett and Salomon [2006] recently measured how variation in the intensity and type of 
screening affect their monthly financial performance and showed that the relationship 
between financial and social performance is curvilinear: high financial returns are associated 
with both high and low levels of social screenings whereas moderate levels of social 
responsibility leads to lower financial performance. To do so, they added a squared screening 
intensity term to their model and found indeed a negative and significant coefficient for 
screening intensity and a positive and significant coefficient for its quadratic. Similarly, 
Renneboog et al. [2008a] recently investigated the influence of both screening activities 
(intensity, nature and investment styles) and fund characteristics (size, age, risk and load fees) 
on risk-adjusted returns but, disregarding Barnett and Salomon article, posited a linear 
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relationship between financial returns and screening activity. Different dummy variables have 
hence been used by the authors to characterise the nature of ethical strategies (activism, 
involvement with local communities, Islamic finance, existence of an in-house SRI research 
team) followed by fund managers while their intensity has been proxied by the number of 
screens. Using control variables to take into account for fund characteristics, investment 
style, country and time effects, the authors have underlined that SRI funds in many European, 
North-American and Asia-Pacific countries strongly underperform domestic benchmark 
portfolios but also that there was no statistically significant evidence that SRI funds 
underperform their conventional counterparts. They have also shown that returns are 
negatively correlated to screening intensity on social and corporate governance. Any 
additional screen is indeed associated with a 1% lower return per annum. Considering that 
Islamic finance is close to traditional SRI regarding the values they intend to defend, but very 
different in the way they implement their financial strategies (prohibition of speculative 
activities and interest practices for Islamic funds), we deemed that any generalization would 
be hardly meaningful and chose to focus on a narrower view of ethical finance: only 
traditional SRI funds based on negative screening are studied here.  
 
 
3  Methodology 
 
In order to overcome the simplicity of single index models and give a better explanation of 
funds' behaviour, more recent empirical studies of mutual funds' financial performance use a 
multi-factor model, known as the Carhart-Fama-French model (hereafter CFF model). We 
constitute a benchmark portfolio    
  (where    
  is the expected real return on a value weighted 
portfolio of global assets (hereafter the benchmark)) and K portfolios for which the included 
funds are in accordance with the criterion k of the number of negative screens. The expected 
return of the portfolio k, called   
  is equal to:  
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   is the expected real return on the asset i to the criterion k, 
Hereafter, we consider the adjusted returns of our portfolios defined as: 
       
       
  
      
       
where     is a worldwide risk-free interest rate. 
 
Surprisingly, with the notable exception of Mill [2006] who however worked on a unique 
Unit trust that was initially conventional and turned to ethical finance, empirical studies on 
SRI funds do not consider the time-varying volatility to our knowledge (see Bauer et al. 
[2005]) whereas financial series are often characterized by ARCH effects. In order to take 
into account these effects, we estimate the following GARCH system
1: 
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1 Variations on ARCH models, such as E-GARCH, were also explored by Brooks [2002] and the GARCH (1,1) 
model proved to be sufficient. 




where   ,  is the world beta of the portfolio k that measures its covariance with the world 
market return standardized by the variance of the world market return.    measures the 
degree to which managers are earning significant returns after accounting for market risk, as 
measured by beta. SMB and HML are small minus big and high minus low benchmark 
factors which respectively measure the excess returns of small caps over large stocks and 
value stocks with high book-to-market ratio and growth stocks, as proposed by Fama-French 
[1993]. UMD stands for up minus down and captures the persistence in mutual fund 
performance (Carhart [1997]). 
 
Once our system is estimated, we test the equality of the different    in order to appraise if 
the intensity of negative screening modifies the performance of SRI portfolios. 
 
4  Data and Results 
 
Our weekly data is extracted from Datastream International. Data covers the period 
3/25/1998-4/01/2008. Our database is formed by 71 European SRI euro-denominated equity 
mutual funds identified by the Eurosif database, regardless of their investment style or 
geographical investment area. We have also collected the number (from 0 for funds with 
best-in-class approach to 16) of negative criteria adopted by each fund as defined by the 
Eurosif database. Unsurprisingly, very different kinds of SRI funds coexist from broad SRI 
funds with single criteria (human right violations, oppressive regimes...) or "moral" funds to 
core SRI funds. Unsurprisingly, "weapons and military contracting" is the most common 
excluding criteria used by ethical funds. 
 
Table 1: Categories of negative screens 
 
Type of negative screen  Number of funds 
Firearms 46 
Weapons and Military  50 
Nuclear Energy  34 
Tobacco 43 
Gambling 31 
Human rights violations  36 
Oppressive regimes  17 
Pornography 33 
Alcohol 24 
Animal testing  15 
Factory farming  5 
Furs 10 
Excessive environmental impact  22 
GMO 20 
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Products dangerous to health/environment  18 
Labor right violations  34 
  Source: Eurosif 
 
We rank SRI funds by intensity of negative screening and consequently by size of investment 
universe. We then constitute three portfolios based on the number of negative screens: the 
first portfolio includes funds with 1 to 4 negative screens, i.e. 24 funds, the second portfolio 
is composed of funds with 5 to 8 negative screens (23 funds) and finally the third fund 
includes funds with 9 to 16 negative screens (24 funds)
2. However, load fees and 
management fees are not considered
3. Our benchmark is the Advanced Sustainable 
Performance Indices (ASPI Eurozone), which is the European index of reference of 
companies and investors "wishing to commit themselves in favor of sustainable development 
and corporate social responsibility". In order to strengthen our results, we also use as 
benchmark the Morgan Stanley Capital International index of Euro area (Hereafter MSCI 
Euro). To get the excess returns of funds and benchmark, we subtract from the raw returns, 
the weekly Euribor 1 month. The maximum number of observations for each series rises to 
523 observations. 
To construct our benchmark factors for the multifactor regression we used the S&P euro 
constituents list. We have built weekly regressors for a period ranging from 25th March 1998 
to 1st April 2008.The SMB factor is obtained by considering two portfolios: the smallest 
capitalizations and the largest ones. We then consider the return on an equiponderate 
portfolio based on these two portfolios. In our paper, each portfolio is rebuilt every week 
according to the median of capitalization. The HML factor is the result of book-to-market 
(BTM) equity groups based on the breakpoints for the bottom 30% and the top 30% of the 
ranked BTMV, excluding the negative BTMV. UMD is a 52-weeks momentum factor which 
is calculated as an equally weighted average returns of funds with the highest 30% 51 week 
returns (lagged 1 week) minus the equally weighted average returns of firms with the lowest 
30% 51 week returns lagged 1 month. 
We conduct a series of stationarity tests for our data. Two criteria to test for non-stationarity 
are employed: ADF and DF-GLS. Both Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Dickey-Fuller with 
GLS de-trending (Eliot, et. al. [1996]) test for the null hypothesis of non-stationarity against 
the alternative of stationarity. Careful inspection of our data series suggests that only the drift 
term should be included in the null hypothesis for considered series. Table 2 displays the 
results. 
 
Table 2: ADF and DF-GLS unit root tests with drift but no time trend 
 
Variables Criterion  ADF  DF-GLS 
SRI funds returns   1 to 4 screening criteria of exclusion (k=1)  -9.71*** -9.71*** 
5 to 8 screening criteria of exclusion (k=2)  -9.58***  -9.59*** 
9 to 16 screening criteria of exclusion (k=3) 
 
-9.68*** -9.69*** 
SRI funds risk-adjusted 
return  
1 to 4 screening criteria of exclusion (k=1)  -5.80*** -1.79* 
5 to 8 screening criteria of exclusion (k=2)  -5.86***  -3.92*** 
9 to 16 screening criteria of exclusion (k=3) 
 
-5.88*** -5.14*** 
ASPI Eurozone risk- _ -6.63***  -5.49*** 
                                                      
2 Each fund is introduced into the portfolio while data is available. Hence, the weight of each fund in portfolio 
can evolve through time. 
3 As European funds have the lowest management fees, we decided not to take them into account (Renneboog et 
al. [2008b]). 
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adjusted return    
      
MSCI Europe risk-
adjusted return 
_ -6.08***  -5.74*** 
      
HML  _ -8.04***  -2.80*** 
SMB  _ -11.58***  -2.38** 
UMD _  -4.19***  -2.84*** 
      
Note: ***, **, * respectively indicates rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. The number of lags in unit root 
tests has been fixed to 4. 
 
 
Table 3 reports univariate statistics of fund’s weekly returns. As we may expect, skewness 
and kurtosis suggest that data is non-normal. This result is reinforced by the Jarque-Bera 
statistic: we reject the hypothesis of normality for each fund. The Ljung-Box Q-statistics for 
raw returns reveal autocorrelation. Moreover our series seem to be characterized by 
conditional heteroscedasticity. Hence, the choice of GARCH representation appears to be 
accurate. 
 





of funds  Mean S.D. SK  EK  JB  stat  Max  Min  Qstat(5)  ARCH(5) 
1 to 4  24  0.00031  0.02183  -0.5  4.63  80.35**  0.09  -0.08  4.12  18.32** 
5 to 8  23  0.00013  0.0227  -0.42  4.86  91.39**  0.1  -0.1  7.8  8.26** 
9 to 16  24  0.00025  0.0222  -0.36  5  98.40**  0.1  -0.09  8.13  13.69** 
Note: SK is the skewness coefficient. EK is the excess kurtosis coefficient. JB stat is the Jarque-Bera statistic. Max is the largest 
observation. Min is the smallest observation. Qstat(5) is the Ljung-Box statistic, calculated with five lags, for raw returns. ARCH(5) 
is the ARCH test, calculated with five lags, for residuals from an AR(5) regression on raw returns. 
** indicates rejection of the null at 5% significance level. 
 
According to table 4a, our results first show that SRI funds outperform traditional ones. 
Aphas associated with the ASPI Eurozone index are lower than those obtained with the MSCI 
Europe index, and appeared to be non-significant: whatever the number of excluding criteria, 
one cannot conclude either on abnormal returns of SRI funds relative to their corresponding 
SRI market index. However, if we turn to the MSCI Europe index, outperformance of 
European SRI funds is proven. We also demonstrate that the number of negative screens 
worsens the performance of portfolio but diminishes market risk, which is consistent with 
Renneboog et al. [2008a] results. Indeed, the Jensen's alpha associated with the first and 
second portfolios is larger than the alpha of the third portfolio whatever the method of 
regression. It finally appears that higher screening intensity is associated with lower betas. 
Funds based on many exclusion criteria seem to adopt a more defensive investment strategy. 
The taking into account of HML, SMB, and UMD is not significant at the 5% level.  
In order to confirm the existence of a negative relationship between the number of excluding 
criteria and risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds, we then run a statistical analysis on the 
equality of alphas (table 4b). 
 
 





Benchmark  α  β1  β2(HML)  β3(SMB)  β4(UMD)  Adjusted 
R² 
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1 to 4 (k=1)  ASPI 
Eurozone  0.18 0.46***  -0.05  -0.03  -0.03  0.360 
    (0.95) (20.32)  (-0.66)  (-0.89)  (-0.79)   
  MSCI Europe  1.23*** 0.47***  -0.08  0.04  0.02  0.342 
    (6.32) (19.14)  (-1.12)  (1.18)  (0.37)   
5 to 8 (k=2)  ASPI 
Eurozone  0.20 0.45***  -0.04  -0.04  -0.01  0.249 
    (0.99) (17.49)  (-0.45)  (-1.05)  (-0.21)   
  MSCI Europe  1.24*** 0.45***  -0.07  0.02  0.04  0.245 
    (5.75) (16.79)  (-0.87)  (0.72)  (0.80)   
9 to 16 (k=3)  ASPI 
Eurozone  0.19 0.40***  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03  0.246 
    (1.01) (16.32)  (-0.27)  (-1.06)  (-0.60)   
  MSCI Europe  1.12*** 0.41***  -0.05  0.02  0.02  0.240 
    (5.72) (15.70)  (-0.60)  (0.69)  (0.35)   
Note: ***, **, * respectively indicates rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. The number of observations is 
equal to 466 for each system. 
 
 
Table 4b: Test of the equality of portfolios performances according to the intensity of 
negative screening 
Benchmark         
ASPI Eurozone                0.23 
           0.22 
           0.08 
           0.08 
    
MSCI Europe                9.44*** 
           0.01 
           3.86** 
           7.85*** 
    
Note: ***, **, * respectively indicates rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
 
 
We show that the hypothesis of the equality between the alphas can clearly be rejected at the 
1% level for the MSCI Europe index, but also that a threshold exists between SRI funds 
regarding the number of excluding criteria that leads to an erosion of their financial 
performance:    is not significantly different from   , but both    and    are, with respect to 
  .  
In order to consider further the impact of investment universe on SRI funds' financial 
performance and check the effective influence of negative screening intensity, we constitute 
two categories of SRI funds within our sample: those with negative screening based on 
sectoral criteria (weapons, alcohol, pornography, furs...) and those with transversal criteria 
(violations of human and labour rights, oppressive regimes...). We then renew our 
econometric analysis to compare alphas of these two categories (Table 5a and 5b). 
 
Table 5a: SRI fund performance according to sectoral vs. transversal screening 
 
Negative screens  Benchmark  α  β1  β2(HML)  β3(SMB)  β4(UMD)  Adjusted 
R² 
Sectoral (k=S)  ASPI Eurozone  0.17 0.39***  -0.05  -0.02  0.02  0.308 
    (0.95) (16.55)  (-0.67)  (-0.71)  (0.55)   
  MSCI Europe  1.00*** 0.39***  -0.08  0.04  0.03  0.295 
    (5.13) (15.51)  (-1.01)  (1.46)  (0.58)   
920Economics Bulletin, 2010, Vol. 30 No. 1 pp. 913-923
8 
 
Transversal (k=T)  ASPI Eurozone  0.20 0.45***  -0.09  -0.02  0.03  0.256 
    (1.09) (17.45)  (-1.16)  (-0.60)  (0.59)   
  MSCI Europe  1.12*** 0.43***  -0.14*  0.05  0.04  0.236 
    (5.59) (15.99)  (-1.71)  (1.64)  (0.78)   
Note: ***, **, * respectively indicates rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. The number of observations is 
equal to 466 for each system. 
 
Table 5b: Test of the equality of portfolios performances according to the type of negative 
screening 
Benchmark         
ASPI Eurozone           0.36 
    
MSCI Europe           4.66** 
    
Note: ***, **, * respectively indicates rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
 
 
These latter analyses bring an interesting result with respect to the MSCI Europe index: 
according to traditional financial portfolio theory, SRI funds with negative screening based 
on sector exclusion appeared to have a worse performance than SRI funds with transversal 
criteria. The null hypothesis that    equals    can indeed be rejected at the 5% significance 
level. We also show that these transversal ethical funds outperform their benchmarks (MSCI 
EURO). As a consequence, the question whether SRI funds under or outperform conventional 
funds is not a proper way to analyse the influence of ethics on financial performance. How 
the nature of screenings (sectoral vs transversal) affects the ability to generate performance 
appears to be a more suitable way to address this question. 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
This paper contributes to the current debate on SRI financial performance. We have indeed 
developed a multi-factor model that allows us to take into account SMB, HML and 
momentum effects, as well as time-varying volatility in order to consider the influence of the 
intensity of extra-financial screenings on ethical funds' performance. We show that 
considering SRI funds universe as homogeneous creates a bias that mitigates the potential 
impact of negative screening on the size of the investment universe and, as a consequence, 
may mislead on their effective financial performance. On the contrary to previous studies that 
posit a functional relationship, either linear or u-shaped, our results show that the number of 
restrictions on SRI funds universe does impact risk-adjusted returns. Higher numbers of 
excluding criteria are associated with lower Jensen alphas. However, as shown by differences 
in exposure to market betas, the higher the number of ethical screens, the less the exposure to 
market risks. If the link between risk-adjusted returns and screening intensity appeared to be 
non-linear, we suggest that the Barnett and Salomon [2006] curvilinearity hypothesis remains 
controversial for European SRI funds. A break can nevertheless be observed: the financial 
performance of funds with more than eight excluding criteria is significantly lower. Further 
studies should be undertaken to consider more deeply the existence of this threshold.  
As a conclusion, we confirm at first stage that risk-return optimization appears to be 
constrained for SRI funds with high social and environmental standards. This conclusion 
should nevertheless be nuanced. In order to confirm the robustness of our results, we indeed 
considered the specific nature of excluding criteria. We identified two families of SRI funds 
and showed that the intensity of negative screening is not a sufficient condition to explain 
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under or outperformance of ethical funds. Indeed, if the nature of negative screening (sectoral 
vs. transversal) is considered for SRI funds with approximately equivalent numbers of 
excluding criteria, interesting results could be found: transversal SRI funds appear to 
outperform the market with a positive alpha, whereas SRI funds with negative screening 
based on sectoral exclusion criterion largely underperform their benchmark. Hence, if the 
intensity of negative screening does impact on SRI funds' financial performance, the specific 
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